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Slaves to the Bottle:
Smith's Civil Damage Liquor Law
ELAINE FRANTZ PARSONS
This brief summary of the humble lives of the plaintiff and her
husband the two principal characters in this tragical case may be
pardoned. . . . [Michael Judge] was 28 years old, a strong, able
bodied, healthy, hard working, laboring man. Nine years before
while yet a boy he married Mary, a very queen among women as
the most cursory perusal of the evidence will show; up to this fatal
Sunday afternoon they had lived in Lyons continuously for seven
years he was the sole support of his darling wife, and his Mary
was spotless in the crowning glory of woman, he was honest and
industrious and they were happy. He is no longer a laborer, he
walks the streets of Lyons today on one leg and his true hearted
wife Mary J. Judge the plaintiff in this case bends over a washtub
day after day to keep them from starving.. . . Who and what con-
tributed in the largest measure to the breaking up of this happy
little home? Whiskey, the demon of man was the weapon and it
was deliberately wielded by [the saloonkeeper].'
Research for this article was made possible by grants from the State Historical
Society of Iowa and the Littleton-Griswald Research Fund of the American
Historical Association, and by the hospitality of Susan Cramer, Carolyn Frantz,
Evelyn Holler, Judy and Ed Pilewski, and Peggy, Mark, Eric, AUyn, Tim, Emily,
Anna, Kristin, and Rebeckah Weddle, and by the excellent staff of the Iowa
State Law Library, especially Linda Robertson, Carol Emerson, and Timothy
Gatti; of the State Historical Sodety of Iowa Libraries in Des Moines and Iowa
City; and of Nancy Witman at the Michigan Law Library; M. Cody Wright,
James Cohlmeyer, and Charles Cali at the Illinois State Archives; and Jill True-
blood at the Illinois Supreme Court. I would like to thank Marvin Bergman for
his encouragement, and the Annals's anonymous readers for pointing out
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1. Mary f. Judge v. John Jordan and Patrick O'Connor (1889), Appellee's Argument,
p. 1, Bound Briefs, Iowa State Law Library (hereafter dted as ISLL), Des Moines
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ON SUNDAY AFTERNOON, January 1, 1887, 28-year-old day
laborer Michael Judge went to his favorite saloon in Lyons, Iowa.
We cannot be sure exactly how much he drank there. He cer-
tainly was in no condition to remember. If anyone knew, it was
probably the saloonkeeper, John Jordan, and he had good legal
reasons not to tell However much Judge drank, when he left
the saloon for home that cold winter evening, he collapsed on
the street. A building in town caught fire during the night, and
in the midst of the resulting chaos one of the firefighters, W. W.
Buell, noticed Judge I)àng on the street and tried to help him to
shelter. When Judge resisted, however, Buell gave up and went
back to firefighting, leaving Judge to remain on the street for
many hours. By the time Judge was finally taken off the street
by another passerby, he had developed such severe frostbite
that one of his legs had to be amputated. Two years later, Mi-
chael's wife, Mary, filed a suit against John Jordan and his busi-
ness partner, asking for $15,000 for the cost of Michael's medical
care and for his lost earning potential. The jury ultimately
awarded her $1,500, which was still a lot of money at a time
when a day laborer earned two or three dollars a day.^
Mary Judge was able to seek compensation from Jordan be-
cause of a piece of Iowa legislation called Smith's Civil Damage
Liquor Law. That law, passed in 1862, allowed drinkers' de-
pendents to sue alcohol vendors. The law was based on a highly
(74 Iowa 166, 37 N.W. 131). This paper is based largely on an exciting and pre-
viously neglected set of sources: trial transcripts from nineteenth-century court
cases. These are valuable sources because they contain often lengthy transcrip-
tions of the words of many non-elite Iowans who otherwise left no written
record of their thoughts and experiences. Thousands of such transcripts re-
main in Iowa. Most are not easily accessible, because they are scattered
throughout the state in district courthouses. Those from cases that were ulti-
mately heard by the state supreme court, however, have been printed, bound,
and deposited at the Iowa State Law Library, Drake University, and the Uni-
versity of Iowa. I used the set of bound briefs housed at the Iowa State Law
Library, and my citations refer to that collection. For readers who may be in-
terested in seeing the resolution of the cases, my footnotes also include cita-
tions to the Iowa Supreme Court decision in eadi case. (These standard legal
citations are also required to locate the particular brief in the collection of
bound briefs housed at the University of Iowa.) These decisions do not include
the transcripts, so the reader who wants to find the context of the quotations
induded in this article will need to consult the bound briefs.
2. ]udge V. Jordan, Plaintiff's Petition, p. 2; Verdict, p. 63.
Slaves to the Bottle 349
unusual idea about the nature of individual responsibility—the
notion that the state could hold one individual liable for the
consequences of the actions of another. Altíiough that notion
seemed strange to many at the time. Smith's Law did have
some precedents: both Massachusetts and Pennsylvania had
passed similar laws in the 1840s; Kansas and Ohio had passed
weak forms of it in the 1850s; and some southem judges had
made similar rulings in the 1840s and 1850s in cases involving
drinking by slaves."^
When Iowa's legislators passed Smith's Law in 1862, how-
ever, the legal notion it represented was still both novel and
controversial. The law made it possible for any individual who
had been injured by another person's drinking to sue the sa-
loonkeeper who had sold that person alcohol. Specifically, un-
der this law, "every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or
other person who shall be injured in person or property, or
mear\s of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence
of the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person . . . shall
have a right of action . . . against any person or persons who
shall by selling intoxicating liquors as in this Act set forth, cause
the intoxication of such person."*
Smith's Law did not take drinkers "off the hook"; courts
generally still held drinkers criminally and civilly responsible
for their acts while intoxicated. Rather, it imposed a redundant
responsibility, both on the drinker and on the drink purveyor.
Plaintiffs "injured in person or property" who were not de-
pendents of drinkers could choose whetíier to sue drinkers or
3. Ernest H. Cherrington et al., eds.. Standard Encyclopedia of the Alcohol Problem,
6 vois. (Westerville, OH, 1924-1930), cited in Jack S. Blocker, Give to tlie Winds
thy Fears: The Women's Temperance Crusade, 1873-1874 (Westport, CT, 1985), 125;
Skinner v. Hughes (1850), 13 Mo. 440, as reported in 97 A.L.R. 3d 528, 557; and
Harrison v. Berkeley (1847), 32 S.C.L. 525, as reported in 97 A.L.R. 3d 528,557.
4.1862 Laws ofloiva, 50. In keeping with the language of this law, which speci-
fies that wives and children have the right to sue, but does not specifically
mention husbands, I deliberately use masculine pronouns throughout this
article to describe "the drunkard." While there certainly were plenty of women
who drank excessively in nineteenth-century Iowa, the image of the drinker or
drunkard in nineteenth-century minds was decidedly male. In fact, female
drinkers in the nineteenth century were often thought of as masculine. When
Iowa's legislators and reformers considered the social cost of drinking, they
had male drinkers in mind.
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saloonkeepers, though saloonkeepers, who often had "deeper
pockets," were frequently more appealing targets. Today, civil
damage laws are used primarily by people who have been hit
by drunken drivers. When such laws were first passed, how-
ever, they were primarily intended for and used by people such
as Mary Judge—the wives and children of men who were killed
or maimed while intoxicated, or who simply drank too much to
be good providers.^
Dramshop laws were, and still are, the cause of great confu-
sion and armoyance to many legal scholars who argue that they
are jarringly out of accord with the rest of the legal tradition.^
An authoritative work on the law of intoxicating liquors pub-
lished in 1910 complained that "much confusion has resulted
from the loose way in which the term 'proximate cause' has been
used by courts and writers" in civil damage cases/ Somehow, in
the middle of the nineteenth century, a handful of state legisla-
tures, including Iowa's, passed a type of law that appeared to
be based on a different notion of legal responsibility than the
rest of American law.
Iowa's role in the history of civil damage laws was crucial
largely because of its timing and context. First, it was early.
Iowa was the first midwestern state to pass a strong version of
the act. Over the course of the next two decades, most neigh-
boring states would follow its lead. Second, the Iowa legislature
w a^s the only one to pass its act during the Civil War. The idea of
"slavery" was central both to the war and, as we will see, to the
logic of the civil damage acts. Iowa's decision to pass it in 1862
made that relationship clear
Smith's Law has had profound and enduring consequences.
A number of states would follow Iowa's lead over the next
twenty years. Such laws remain on the books and in use today
in many states, including Iowa. They, in turn, have served as
5. Although children had the right to recover under the Act, they could not
themselves be plaintiffs. Rather, adults {often their mothers) brought suits on
their behalf.
6. See Timothy Lytton, "Responsibility for Human Suffering: Awareness, Par-
ticipation, and the Frontiers of Tort Law," Cornell Law Revieio 78 (1993), 492-95.
7. W. W. Woollen and W. W. Thornton, intoxicating Liquors: The Law Relating to
tlie Traffic in Intoxicating Liquors and Dninkainess (Cincirmati, OH, 1910), 1864.
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precedents for other important twentieth-century litigation and
legislation. The sweeping consequences of Smith's Law were not
limited to the legal sphere. Its passage affected the lives of thou-
sands of Iowa drirücers, drinkers' families, and saloonkeepers. It
changed the way saloonkeepers did business, the way drinkers
experienced their leisure time, and the way wives and children
interacted with their saloon-going providers.
The Iowa legislature passed the law during an exceptional
historical period and under the influence of a new and radical
body of ideas. In passing the bill, Iowa's legislators wrote into
law and thereby perpetuated a new constellation of popular
ideas about moral and legal responsibility. The story of the bill's
history, then, is the story of how legislators and other nineteenth-
century midwestemers came to reimagine responsibility and
autonomy. The most interesting part of the story may well be
the lessons it teaches about how new complexes of ideas spread:
how they come to be transmitted from one region to another and
from one subject to another. To explore the history of Smith's
Civil Damage Liquor Law is to trace the process by which an
idea, emerging at the right historical moment, became a perma-
nent part of the law, and in turn changed not only the shape of
the law itself, but the experiences of those living under it^
IT IS NOT EASY for litigious Americans at the turn of the
twenty-first century to recogrüze just how radical and unusual
Smith's Civil Damage Liquor Law was. Before its passage, Mary
Judge would have had no claim against John Jordan. Under the
8. In the past few years, some scholarly attention has focused on the history of
liquor legislation in the United States. The two standard recent monographs
on the subject are Richard F. Hamm, Slmping the Eighteenth Amendment: Temper-
ance Reform, Legal Culture, and the Polity. 1880-1920 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1995);
and Perry R. Duis, The Saloon: Public Drinking in Chicago and Boston, 1880-1920
(Urbana, IL, 1983), which usefully compares saloon regulation in Boston and
Chicago. To learn about the progress of temperance legislation in one of Iowa's
neighboring states, see Robert Smith Bader, Prohibition in Kansas: A History
(Lawrence, KS, 1986). The most thorough treatment of the history of liquor
legislation in Iowa is Dan Elbert Clark, "The Beginnings of Liquor Legislation
in Iowa," Iotrn Journal of History and Politics 5 (1907), 193-212; idem, "The His-
tory of Liquor Legislation in Iowa," ibid. 6 (1908), 55-87,339-74, 503-608. For a
broader view of the legislative context out of which liquor legislation emerged,
see John E. Briggs, History of Social Legislation in Iowa (Iowa City, 1915).
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common law, drinkers' dependents did not have the right to re-
cover damages from saloonkeepers.' Traditionally, an injured per-
son only had the right to sue someone if that person's action had
directly caused the injury. If some other person's action had inter-
vened between the first person's action and the injury, the first
person would not be held responsible. If John Smith failed to se-
cure his horse adequately to a post, and then Robert Jones began
deliberately tormenting the horse so that it bolted down the street,
harming Mary Brown, Brown could recover from Jones, but not
Smith. So, under the common law, when Michael Judge got drunk
and lost his leg to frostbite, John Jordan might have played an
important role in the injury, but Judge himself, by voluntarily
drinking the alcohol, bore ultimate legal responsibility for hav-
ing become intoxicated. His own act of dririking, then, was the
"proximate cause" of his injury, and of his wife's loss of income.
Since the act of the drinker in consuming an alcoholic beverage
superceded the act of the saloonkeeper in selling the beverage as
a cause of intoxication, even if intoxication had "caused" an in-
jury, the saloonkeeper was not legally resporisible.'"
Civil damage laws such as Smith's changed this. They "dis-
placed the common-law rule that the proximate cause of intoxi-
cation was not the furnishing of the liquor but its consump-
tion."" Although Smith's Civil Damage Liquor Law was quite
unusual at the time, it has come to sound more familiar in re-
cent years as individuals and governments have brought con-
9. For a summary of the history of the legal reasoning behind civil damage
laws in the nineteenth century, see the extensive and v/ell-documented histori-
cal digression in the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in the case of Nolan
V. Morelli (1967), 154 Conn. 432,226 A.2d 383.
10. See, for instance, the discussion King v. Henkie (1886) 80 Ala 505, as reported
in 54 A.L.R. 2d 1156: "whatever wrong or negligence might be attributable to
the defendant was not an approximate or efficient cause of death, because the
defendant merely sold the liquor, and that in and of itself would not have pro-
duced the fatal result had not the decedent of his own volition, or as a result of
his voluntarily having destroyed his senses, drunk the liquor." See also 97 A.L.R.
3d 533: "At common law, it was not a tort to either sell or give intoxicating li-
quor to ordinary able-bodied men, and no cause of action existed against one
furnishing liquor in favor of those injured by the intoxication of the person so
furnished, the reason usually given for this rule being that the drinking of the
liquor, not the furnishing of it, was the proximate cause of the injury."
11. Nolan V. Morelli, 154 Conn, at 437.
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troversial lawsuits against cigarette manufacturers. There is
nothing particularly novel about basing a suit on the argument
that using tobacco products has damaged smokers' health.
Manufacturers have long faced lawsuits when their products
have malfunctioned or posed hidden dangers. Nor is it strange
for plaintiffs to seek additional damages by arguing that to-
bacco comparées withheld and manipiJated the evidence they
had about their products' dangerous effects while continuing to
sell a product they knew to be harmful. Plaintiffs in cigarette
cases face a special challenge, however, since the health risks of
smoking were well known even though cigarette makers derüed
them. Because most smokers had been amply warned of the
health risks of tobacco products, it is more difficult to maintain
that cigarette companies' marupulations and cover-ups did
much to change smokers' behavior and that the smokers them-
selves did not voluntarily contribute to their own injury.
Largely as a response to this challenge, plaintiffs have mobilized
another argument to place responsibility for the consequence of
cigarette use on tobacco companies. They have maintained that
the tobacco companies deliberately caused smokers to become
addicted to their product. Even though tobacco products have
long carried governmental warning labels about their health
effects, and even though those health risks were well known to
smokers, they were unable to stop using them because tobacco
companies, by clever and deliberate marüpulation of nicotine
levels and so on, worked hard to keep them dependent.
Civil damage legislation such as Smith's Civil Damage Liq-
uor Law laid the groundwork for this sort of legal reasoning. In
the nineteenth century thousands of women like Mary Judge,
and also drinkers' children represented by their "next friends"
(usually their mothers), brought suits against saloonkeepers for
compensation for damages caused by their husbands' and fa-
thers' alcohol use. Like cigarette suits today, nineteenth-century
suits against the saloon appealed to legislators and others partly
for economic reasons. Nineteenth-century saloon-going, like
smoking today, carried a heavy social cost. Today's taxpayers
have to foot the bill for many patients with diseases such as
emphysema and lung cancer. Similarly, nineteenth-century citi-
zens had to provide some level of support for the families of
354 THE ANNALS OF IOWA
those "drunkards" who were injured, killed, or rendered incom-
petent as breadwiiuiers as a result of drink. It made sense to
nineteenth-century legislators to require those who profited
from the sale of alcohol to compensate families who were
harmed by the breadwiruiers' use of their product. Not only
would that ease the burden on the rest of the commimity, it
would make saloonkeeping a less attractive line of business to
go into, and would force those who persisted in keeping sa-
loons to look after the welfare of their customers.
But economic considerations were or\ly part of the motiva-
tion. Holding saloonkeepers respor\sible for Ü\e cor\sequences of
their customers' drinking also made sense to many nineteenth-
century Americans because they believed that, as cigarette plain-
tiffs argue of cigarette manufacturers today, saloorüceepers de-
liberately addicted their customers to alcohol, and that drinkers
therefore were not free to stop using it before it injured them
and their families. Because of more general changes in ways of
talking about alcohol and free will, the belief that saloonkeepers
could be held responsible for the consequences of their custom-
ers' behavior had become plausible by the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury in a way it never had been earlier.
Many historians have written about the cultural importance
of the saloon in the nineteenth century. In both urban and rural
communities, it served as a central space where men came to-
gether socially. It was the place to go to get the local news, to
find temporary work or workers, to make business deals, to get
out of bad weather, to grab a bite to eat, and, of course, to have a
few—or more than a few—drir\ks.'^
By the 1850s, as Iowa became more heavily settled, an in-
creasing number of Iowans were complaining that saloons were
12. Although most of the work on the saloon culture has focused on cities and
on the Northeast, it is still useful for the historian of the midwestem saloon.
See, for instance, Duis, The Saloon; Catherine Gilbert Murdock, Domesticating
Drink: Women. Men. and Alcohol in America, 1870-1940 (Baltimore, 1998); Tho-
mas J. Noel, The City and the Saloon: Denver, 1858-1916 (Lincoln, NE, 1982);
Madelon Powers, Faces Along the Bar: Lore and Order in the Workingntan's Saloon,
1870-1920 (Chicago, 1998); and Roy Rosenzweig, Eight Hours for What We Will:
Workers and Leisure in an Industrial City. 1870-1920 (New York, 1983). For a
wonderful older anecdotal account of saloon life, see George Ade, The Old-
Time Saloon: Not Wet — Not Dry Just History (New York, 1931).
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Patrons of an Iowa saloon pose for a typical nineteenth-century scene of
conviviality. Photo courtesy State Historical Society ofloiva, Iowa City.
a social problem. They argued that too many formerly upstand-
ing men were becoming drunkards who were unable to support
their families, who threatened the peace and safety of their com-
munities, and who were incapable of being good workers and
citizens.
Citizer\s dealt with the recognition that the consumption of
alcohol was a social problem in two ways. First, they disci-
plined those drinkers who were burdening their fanulies and
commmuties, punishing them for vagrancy and public drunk-
enness. But they also struck out in a new direction, blaming the
saloon, and the saloonkeeper, for causing alcohol-related social
problems. In 1853, for instance, the KeoJaik Sunbeam reported,
"We learn of a case in eastern New York where a rumseller has
been held to bail in the sum of $1000, on the charge of ntan-
slaughter, for selling liquor to a drunkard, after the remon-
strance of his friends. Just as it should be."'^ The sentiment this
13. Keokuk Sunbeam, 1 June 1853.
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article expressed was consistent with a general trend toward
assigning blame to the seller of the drink along with or rather
than the drinker himself. Those most concerned about the alco-
hol problem were coming to believe that the best way to ad-
dress it was not to purush or condemn drinkers, but rather to
attack saloons and saloonkeepers.
IT IS USEFUL to thirüc about the temperance movement gen-
erally, and the civil damage acts in particular, geographically.
Temperance reform had a long history by the time of ¿\e Civil
War. Attacks on alcohol, which would eventually result in na-
tional prohibition, had begun in earnest in New England and
the mid-Atlantic in the 1820s through the 1840s. The East Coast
was clearly dominant in the movement during its early years.
The first major temperance organizations were headquartered
in the East. The American Temperance Society, for iristance, be-
gan in 1826 in Massachusetts. The Washingtonians, who domi-
nated the temperance scene in the 1840s, started out in Baltimore.
The Sons of Temperance, important in the 1850s, began in New
York.'* Around the time of the Civil War, however, two things
happened to the movement. Firsts it lost momentum as reform-
ers shifted their energy and attention to the war effort. Second,
its center shifted from the East Coast to the upper Midwest,
where it would remain through the rest of the century. After the
war, the two biggest temperance groups were of midwestern
origin. The Woman's Christian Temperance Union began in Ohio
and was headquartered in Illinois. The Anti-Saloon League also
emerged from Ohio.'^  Iowa, with both a strong body of prohibi-
tion supporters and a significant pro-saloon contingent, became
a crucial and hotly contested battleground in the movement.
Smith's Civil Damage Liquor Law was Iowa's first major
effort to hold saloonkeepers legally responsible for their clients'
14. For a brief stuvey of early temperance movements, their eastern origins,
and their spread to the West, see Jed Dannenbaum, Drink and Disorder: Temper-
ance Reform in Cincinnati from the Washingtonian Revival to tlie WCTU (Urbana,
IL, 1984), 16-62.
15. Dannenbaum, Drink and Disorder, 227. On the origins of the Anti-Satoon
League, see K. Austin Kerr, Organized for Prohibition: A New History of the Anti-
Saloon League (New Haven, CT, 1985).
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behavior. Although it was patterned after similar laws that had
already been passed in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania,'* the
history of liquor legislation in Iowa during its territorial and
early statehood periods established the Hawkeye State as one of
the leaders in this area. Iowa was settled and orgarùzed during
the period when northem reform sentiment was at its height,
and temperance was one of the major reforms of the era. Many
looked at Iowa as a blank slate, providing the opportunity to
structure a community that would be free of the social vices
plaguing eastern cities. Even before Iowa gained statehood, its
leadership had been both public and aggressive in condemning
alcohol use. Robert Lucas, the first governor of the Iowa Territory,
in his first address to the territorial legislature in 1838, identified
intemperance, along with gambling, as "the fountains from
which almost every other crime proceeds." The very next year,
Lucas would agree to serve as president of a territorial temper-
ance society. His was also among the earliest voices calling for
local option legislation, that is, legislation giving each town the
right to ban liquor within its limits. This local option legislation
finally passed a decade later, in 1847, though it was very poorly
enforced and soon repealed.'^
Lucas, after leaving office, continued his temperance work.
In 1850 a newspaper in distant Tennessee reported an exciting
new idea for temperance legislation proposed at a temperance
convention by Lucas and other prominent Iowa reformers. Un-
der that legislation, "Persons furnishing liquors [would be con-
sidered] particeps criminis if any crime be committed in conse-
quence of it Sellers [would be held] liable also for damages
that ensue [in consequence of drirtó\g their liquors]."'* Although
similar laws had been passed in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania,
16. Davenport Daily Democrat and News, 17 March 1862.
17. "Governor's Address," Jounml of the House of Representatives of the First leg-
islative Assembly of the Territory of Iowa (Burlington, 1838), 8; Clark, "The Begin-
nings of Liquor Legislation," 201; idem, "The History of Liquor Legislation," 56.
For more on Lucas, see Robert R. Dykstra, Bright Radical Star: Black Freedom and
White Supremacy on the Hawkeye Frontier (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 23.
18. Brownlow's Knoxville Whig, 30 November 1850. Other leaders of the con-
vention were Joseph Williams, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (president);
Dr. Parke (vice-president), and L[incoin?] Clark.
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they had received little press and seem to have been little used,
so the Iowa convention's proposed legislation received national
attention as a novel solution. It also laid the groundwork in Iowa
for Smith's Civil Damage Liquor Law, which would be passed a
dozen years later.
Iowa was a fertile field in which transplanted eastern re-
formist notions and experiments such as civil damage laws
could flourish. But Iowa also had a different relationship to the
"liquor problem" than did its eastern neighbors; its frontier lo-
cation may have made the controversial civil damage laws even
more appealing to it. During the territorial and early statehood
periods, Iowans associated the evils of alcohol with "the Indian
problem." They were convinced that the alcohol being provided
to American Indiar\s by white traders led to the tribes' decline.
Governor John Chambers, in his 1845 message to the legislature,
piously expressed a fear that, "so long as [the Winnebagoes] are
supplied with liquor . . . they will continue to diminish in num-
ber and to descend if possible, into still lower depths of degra-
dation."'*" Iowans were almost certainly more concerned about
American Indian drinking, however, because they believed that
it inspired violence against white settlers. Legislatures in those
early years, therefore, spent a good deal of time and energy try-
ing to prevent the sale of alcohol to American Indians.
In moving to frontier Iowa, then, northeastern reform no-
tions such as temperance encountered new influences and took
on new significance. As legislators addressed the issue of drink-
ing by whites and Indians alike, it would be surprising if the
two separate issues had not informed and shaped one another.
Iowans' focus on the devastating impact of alcohol on American
Indian tribes increased their concerns about the danger that
white drinkers posed to their own families and commuruties.^
More importantly still, Iowa legislators agreed that Indian drink-
ing problems were best addressed not by attempting to reform
19. "Governor's Message," Journal of the House of Representatives of the Seventh
Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Iowa (Fort Madison, 1845), 17.
20. For a detailed account of the relationship between tribal decline and prohi-
bition sentiment in nineteenth<entury temperance discourse, see Elaine Frantz
Parsons, "Manhood Lost: Drink, Gender, and the Self in the Nineteenth-
Century United States" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1999), 188-92.
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the Indians themselves, but rather by penalizing those who
provided the liquor. When Govemor Lucas, who was leading
the charge against liquor sales to Indians, said that liquor sellers
were "morally accountable for all the crimes and wretchedness
produced by the use of such ardent spirits," he might as well
have been referring to Indian traders. In fact, however, he was
talking about those who sold liquor to white Iowans.^'
As Iowans grew increasingly concerned about the conse-
quences of the liquor trade, they perpetually deluged the terri-
torial and early state legislatures with petitions calling for either
a tightening or a loosening of liquor legislation. As a result, the
legislatures considered some form of temperance legislation in
every session. Liquor laws frequently emerged as partisan is-
sues in Iowa as they did on the national stage. The state regu-
larly flip-flopped between local option, license, prohibition, and
anti-saloon legislation. In 1846, for instance, legislators passed a
local option law." The next year, they gave voters the right to
vote to exclude the sale of liquor in amounts of less than one
gallon in their counties. They believed that this law would not
survive a legal test, however, and did not enforce it, though it
stayed on the books. In 1851, when a court upheld a similar law
in PeruTsylvania, Iowa legislators determined that their law was,
in fact, constitutional." Often, they would pass strong-sounding
anti-liquor laws, but would add amendments that rendered
them insigruficant. In 1855, for example, they amended a pro-
hibitory law to exclude apple cider and grape, currant, and
other wines produced in the state.^ *
Smith's Civil Damage Liquor Law was a breath of fresh air in
this longstanding political morass. Like most anti-alcohol legisla-
tion, the bill drew its support from Republicar\s and was opposed
by most Democrats. Named after Senator Sherman G. Smith, a
29-year-old Republican lawyer from Jasper, the bill inspired con-
siderable partisan debate. With a significant Republican majority
in both houses, however, the bill passed handily.
21. Clark, "The Beginnings of Liquor Legislation," 201.
22.1846 Iowa Territorial House Journal, 12 lanuary 1846, HR File No. 29.
23.1850 lozoa House Journal, 195-96.
24.1855 Iowa House Journal. 213.
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IT WAS NO COINCIDENCE that Iowa's attack on the sa-
loon should have come during the Civil War. The war had
both fed on and generated strong antislavery sentiment in the
North, so it made rhetorical sense for Iowa Republicans to
concern themselves with "slaves to the bottle" as they warred
against the southern slave power. Antebellum reformers, as
early as the 1840s, had argued that drirJdng was a form of
slavery, and had spread that view not only in speeches and
newspapers, but also in songs, poems, short stories, ¿ind novels
about the plight of the drinker and his family." These reformers
described drinkers as fettered to the bottle, to the "rum power"
(something similar to the "slave power" that Free Soilers found
so threatening), or to their own corrupt desires. Iowans both
within and outside the legislature were familiar with and gen-
erally s3Tnpathetic to this parallel between African American
slaves and slaves to the bottle. In other words, many Iowar\s
saw drinkers—particularly heavy drinkers—as slaves to the
saloonkeeper, who had control over their money, their time,
and their actions. Like southern slaves, Iowans believed, heavy
drinkers lacked the freedom to make their own choices about
how to live their lives.
Just because some Iowans saw drirJdng as a form of slavery
does not necessarily mean that they assumed drinkers lacked
legal responsibility for their own actions. Indeed, the question
of the extent to w^hich others could be held legally responsible
for the consequences of the actiorxs of actual slaves posed a seri-
ous dilemma for antebellum southern courts. As it turns out,
the peculiar idea of moral responsibility manifested in the civil
damage acts may well have derived from the way the Peculiar
Institution itself handled this question.
Historian Mark Tushnet, in his study of the law of slavery in
the antebellum South, argues that there was a fundamental
contradiction in American slave law between the desire to base
25. See, for instance, A. D. Milne, Uncle Sam's Farm Fence (New York, 1854).
Harriet Beecher Stowe, author of Uncle Tom's Cabin, also used the term slave to
describe heavy drinkers. See Harriet Beecher Stowe, "Betty's Bright Idea," in
Betty's Bright Idea. Also, Deacon Pitkin's Farm, and The Eirst ChristTtias of New
England (1876; reprint, Freeport, NY, 1972).
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decisions on humanity or on interest.^ * To what extent should
slaves be considered as subjects, in which case the law had a
responsibility to protect them and enforce their rights? To what
extent should they be considered chiefly as property, in which
case the law's primary responsibility in relation to slaves was to
enforce their masters' rights to their persons and labor? This
question of whether slaves should be considered as subjects or
objects ultimately reduced to whether they should be consid-
ered as humans possessing free will or as objects merely serving
the will of masters. To preserve the embattled slave society, it
was necessary that the law protect masters' proprietary rights
to slaves, but slaves kept on behaving unmistakably as though
they possessed wills of their own. Southem lawmakers' and
judges' attempts to deal with slaves, who were at once humans
and property, who sometimes acted as extensions of their mas-
ters' will and sometimes willed their own actions, exacerbated
a significant awkwardness in the legal system. It introduced a
large class of sane adults whose responsibility for their own ac-
tior\s was in doubt.
Southem judges dealt with this problem by insisting that
slaves, though property, were a particular kind of property pos-
sessing free will. There was, however, some slippage in judges'
insistence on slaves' free will. For ir\stance, judges realized that
slaves were not always in a position to exercise their wills freely.
In rüneteenth-century American law, the freedom to enter into
voluntary contracts with others was a linchpin of free will and
legal subjectivity. It was partly for this reason that a slave hired
out by his master to do risky work needed more legal protection
than did a free man. Whereas a free man had voluntarily agreed
to undertake a certain type of work under certain conditions for
certain remuneration, a slave had usually not entered into any
such agreement, and his disobedience would put him in physi-
cal peril.^'
In some cases, southem judges were willing to move even
further in doubting a slave's free will. Significantly, two of the
26. Mark V. Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860 (Princeton, NJ,
1981), 53; Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New
York, 1976), 25-31.
27. Tushnet, American Law of Slavery.
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cases in which judges went furthest in positing will-less slaves
involved the consumption of alcohol. In two important slave
cases, Harrison v. Berkeley (1847) and Skinner v. Hughes (1850),
slaves had purchased alcohol from white men, became intoxi-
cated, and died. In both cases, the courts required the men who
had sold the alcohol to compensate the owners of the slaves for
having caused the intoxication leading to death. Although these
cases were decided under the common law, the judges claimed
that since the drinkers were slaves, common law precedents
needed to be altered. They argued that slaves would naturally
drink alcohol if it were offered them; they lacked the power of
will to abstain. In Skinner, for ir\stance, the court held that "the
death of the slave was a natural consequence of the act of the de-
fendant in providing him with the means of intoxication, the
death having er\sued without the occurrence of any such extra-
ordinary conjunction of circumstances as that the usual course
of nature has been departed from."^ In a sense, the judges were
claiming that offering a slave a drink was tantamount to re-
strairüng him and pouring it down his throat. Functionally, the
slave's act of consuming alcohol was held not to be a willed act
superceding the sale in the chain of causation but rather a
"natural cortsequence" of the sale. Logically this makes little
ser\se, since in theory the defect in a slave's will was simply that
his master's could be imposed upon it, and there was no evi-
dence in these cases that the nmsters had caused their slaves to
drink. What was happening was that two cultural presupposi-
tions—that slaves lacked free will and that drinkers lacked free
will—^had run together in the judges' minds, and that the legal
consequences of the former were being trarxsferred to the latter
by a kind of contagion.
One could imagine that in the North and after the Civil War
judges could have heaved a great sigh of relief at the elimination
of the highly problematic status of the slave. Why, then, almost
fifty years after the end of slavery, did an important 1910 trea-
tise on the law of intoxicating liquors devote two full pages to
considering the regulation of sales of alcohol to slaves? The au-
28. Skinner v. Hughes (1850) 13 Mo. 440 as reported in 97 A.L.R. 3d 528, 557; and
Harrison v. Berkeley (1847) 32 S.C.L. 525 as reported in 97 A.L.R. 3d 528, 557.
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thors themselves explained that the regulations "still have suffi-
cient interest to warrant a short review of the cases."^ The prece-
dents were still significant precisely because they still lived on
in other areas of law, including the civil damage acts. Although
there is no "smoking gun," it seems likely, given the rhetoric of
the mid-nineteenth century and the similarity between the deci-
sions in cases such as Skinner and Harrison and the civil damage
acts, that in drafting and advocating the dvil damage laws of the
1840s through 1860s, legislators in Iowa, Pennsylvania, Massa-
chusetts, and Wisconsin looked to those decisions for inspiration.
At the very least, the southern decisions assigning responsibility
for slaves' drinking to liquor purveyors and the northern legis-
lation doing the same for free men emerged from a common con-
cern about drink, slavery, and autonomy. By the 1870s, when the
civil damage laws had spread to many states and when enforce-
ment of them began in earnest, the language of slavery pervaded
northern civil damage act testimony, briefs, and decisions.
Civil damage act plaintiffs, their attorneys, and on occasion
judges either metaphorically described drinkers as "slaves" or
directly claimed that they lacked autonomy. The judge in an
early Illinois civil damage case. People v. Frederick Mapes (1873),
instructed jurors to take evidence that a man exercised "Will
Power" as proof that he was "not a slave to his appetite for in-
toxicating liquor." A lawyer in Iowa in 1880 described drunk-
ards as "slaves to their appetites." Louise Faivre's lawyer ar-
gued, about twenty years later, that "habitual drunkards" such
as Andrew Faivre were "slaves of the saloon keeper." Another
case suggested that a man's drinking had "fettered his will."
Even when they did not use the language of slavery, court offi-
cials often claimed that drinkers, at least habitual drinkers,
lacked free will and moral responsibility. The judge in a Michi-
gan case, Lafler v. Fisher (1899), for instance, instructed the jury
that an intoxicated man's "usual will power is temporarily sus-
pended." Similarly, a plaintiff's attorney in another case sug-
gested that when saloonkeepers sold alcohol to a man until he
was drunk, they made "the will theirs and not his." In a deci-
sion in another civil damage case, the Iowa Supreme Court
29. Woollen and Thornton, Intoxicating Liquors, 736, Article 2, §736.
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Andrew Faivre displays his injured hands in this court
photo. Courtesy îozua State Law Library.
ir\sisted that some drinkers' actions could not be seen as volun-
tary. Responding to the saloonkeeper's attorney's argument that
"involuntary whiskey drinking is something foreign to human
experience," the court insisted that "voluntary means spontane-
ously, of one's own will, without being moved, influenced, or
impelled by others. It is one of the saddest facts in human na-
ture that many persons do both buy and drink intoxicating li-
quor who, spontaneously, of their own will, without being in-
fluenced or impelled by others, would not have done so."^
30. State of Illinois v. Frederick Mopes (1873), p. 77, Case Files, Illinois State Archives
(69 111. 523); /. £. Sansom v. James Greenough and Oiarles Bullock (1880), Appellee's
Argument, p. 5, Bound Briefs, ISLL (55 Iowa 127, 7 N.W. 482); Louise Faivre v.
John Mandersheid, John Arensdorf, and E. J. Ressegiu (1902), Appellee's Argument,
p. 13, ibid. (117 Iowa 724, 90 N.W. 76); A. F Bissell. Administrator of Estate of
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In all of these cases, legislators and courts were treating a
class of white, male drinkers as though they were not autono-
mous and requiring saloonkeepers to answer for the conse-
quences of those drinkers' actions. Some used even more de-
grading metaphors than slavery in connection with the civil
damage acts. One saloon lawyer complained, "The underlying
idea [of the civil damage act] is, that a drunken man is a sort of
ferocious animal, and whoever puts him in that condition, must
answer for his violence; the same as the owner of a vicious beast,
who lets him loose to gore or injure others." A plaintiff's lawyer
compared a drinker to "an infant of tender years, or an idiot, or
a person NON COMPOS MENTIS from any cause." ^ '
Drawing on the metaphorical language of temperance re-
formers, and on the recently abolished institution of slavery itself,
courts in civil damage act cases began to work under the premise
that at least some drinkers lacked free will. Courts increasingly
adopted the metaphorical understanding of the drur\kard as will-
less and took unprecedented steps to deal with him in the face of
his lack of will. The arguments that moved juries and, one pre-
sumes, judges and legislators as well, to take this step depended
to a large extent not on scientific or philosophical reasorùng but
on the power of the drunkard narrative, which had already
minimized the existence of the drir\ker's will, and which was
increasingly retold as a guide to public policy
Plaintiffs' lawyers portrayed saloonkeepers as melodramatic
villains, "chuckl[ing] . . . with glee" while pocketing the money
from desperate drinkers' wives' "toil at the washtub."" Lawyers
Erank S. Law, Deceased v. Frank Starzinger (1900), Appellant's Argument, pp. 6
and 10 (quoting from [William Henry?] Schooler on Wills), ibid. (112 Iowa 266,
83 N.W. 1065); Martlia Laßer v. Ediuard L. Fisher, Henry Kirchgessner, and Enos
Plumadore (1899), Instructions to Jury, p. 127, Bound Briefs, Michigan State Law
Library (121 Mich. 60, 79 N.W. 934); Carrie Kearney v. James Fitzgerald (1876),
Appellant's Brief, pp. 37,586, ibid. (43 Iowa 580). For a broader treatment of the
history of ideas of alcohors threat to the will, see Mariana Valverde, Diseases of
the Will: Alcohol and the Dilemmas of Freedom (New York, 1998).
31. E. M. Galloway, Appellee v. James Laydon, Appellant (1877), Appellant's Argu-
ment, p. 10, Bound Briefs, ISLL (47 Iowa 456); Bissell v. Starzinger, p. 5 (empha-
sis in original).
32. Elizabeth Engleken v. Hubert Webber and John Weston (1877), Appellee's Ar-
gument, p. 4, Bound Briefs, ISLL (47 Iowa 558).
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painted grim pictures of saloorüceepers' deliberate attempts to
oppress their patrorxs' families. Take, for instance, the flowery
rhetoric used by the lawyer for Mary Judge in the passage that
opens this article. In beginning his argument with a "brief sum-
mary of the humble lives of the plaintiff and her husband the
two principal characters in this tragical case," going on to de-
scribe how "whiskey, the demon of man," deliberately wielded
by a saloonkeeper, destroyed the "happy little home" of a
"strong, able bodied, healthy, hard working, laboring man . . .
honest and industrious" and his "darling wife... spotless in the
crowning glory of woman," he was squeezing temperance melo-
drama for all it was worth."
TEMPERANCE HISTORIAN Jack Blocker has argued that
the civil damage acts did not do much to improve conditions
for drinkers' families, since plaintiffs often lost on appeal and
since they often had a difficult time collecting their money even
when they won.^ '' He certainly has a point: Iowa plaintiff Kate
Buckham, for ii\stance, succeeded in winrüng $3,000, but had to
bring an entirely new suit to get her money when the defendant
transferred his property to another person to avoid paying her.^ ^
But even if it did not always function as legislators may have
hoped, the act had a major impact on the lives of drinkers,
drinkers' dependents, and saloonkeepers alike.
Drinkers' wives w e^re foremost in the minds of legislators
when they passed civil damage laws. They intended to assist
women whose husbands had been led astray and no longer
supported them. In fact, even if these women had a difficult
time claiming the money they had been awarded, the very ex-
istence of the laws gave them an important weapon to wield
against their husbands' saloonkeepers. Mary Fox of Dubuque,
for instance, testified that before bringing her case in 1881 she
had approached her husband's saloonkeeper personally, saying,
"I wish yourself and also notify [other saloonkeepers] not to sell
33. Judge V. Jordan, Appellee's Argument, p. 1.
34. Blocker, Give to the Winds thy Fears, 132.
35. Kate £. Buckham v. H. R. Grape and Elizabeth White (1885), Bound Briefs, ISLL
(65 Iowa 333,22 N.W. 664).
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or give my husband any intoxicating liquors. I said he neglects
work and is also neglecting his family" Her claim that he did
not adequately heed her warning was at the heart of her law-
suit. Saloonkeepers usually knew that they could not afford to
dismiss family members' complaints. If wives could, by raising
the specter of a civil damage suit, scare their husbands' saloon-
keepers out of selling alcohol to them, they could, and did, also
use that power as a bargaining chip with their husbands,
threatening to have a word with saloonkeepers if husbands did
not straighten out.
Saloonkeepers usually took wives' threats seriously because
they did pose a very real problem for them. The families of
drinkers, often impoverished and bereaved, evoked juries'
S3TTipathies more readily than saloorikeepers, and they fre-
quently won in their irütial trials. Even if saloonkeepers man-
aged to win on appeal, in the meantime they had to invest sig-
nificant time and money in the process. Furthermore, as busi-
nessmen dependent on the good will of their customers, they
could ill afford to land in the middle of local controversy. Surely,
the mere possibility of a civil damage suit caused saloonkeepers
to think twice about whether their profit on another glass of
whiskey was worth the risk.
SALOONKEEPERS AND DRINKERS were not without their
defenders, however. Such defenders of moderate drinking re-
sisted defining drinkers as slaves. Instead, they argued, "humans
were innately possessed of self-goven\ment; to say otherwise
was to destroy their will and place them in the grips of an out-
side power."^ Temperance rhetoric's defirütion of drinkers as
slaves, which suggested that they lacked their own wills, served
as the chief rallying point for temperance opponents. They at-
tacked reformers' understanding of drinkers' autonomy both by
ii\sisting that it was not true and by pragmatically arguing that
36. Mary Fox v. John Wunderlich (1884), Bound Briefs, ISLL (64 Iowa 187, 20
N.W. 7),
37. David S. Reynolds, "Black Cats and Delirium Tremens: Temperance and the
American Renaissance," in David S. Reynolds and Debra J. Rosenthal, eds., Vte
Serpent in the Cup: Temperance in American Literature (Amherst, MA, 1997), 31.
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adopting such an understanding would dangerously under-
mine the traditions of freedom at the core of America's heritage.
When temperance opponents challenged reformers' claims
about free will, they often did so in religious language. They
readily admitted, as it would have been difficult for them to
deny, that some individuals drarüc to excess, and that their fam-
ilies and communities suffered for it. But they argued that ex-
cessive drinking was only one among many vices in which sin-
ful men and women chose to indulge. It was true that it became
progressively more difficult for fi-equent drinkers to stop drink-
ing, but that was because indulging in any sin increases the sin-
ner's desire to sin. In this case, temperance opponents agreed
with Puritan divine Jonathan Edwards, who had argued more
than a century earlier that the habitual drinker did not lose his
ability to stop drinking; he did not become "addicted" or "en-
slaved" to drink.^ Instead, he repeatedly opted to sin because
sinning became increasingly attractive to him.
Temperance opponents' view of excessive drinking as the
product of a sinful rather than an impotent will often led them,
urüike temperance reformers, to criticize the general character
of excessive drinkers. "When a man disgraces himself in any
other way," Kansas newspaperman Edgar Watson Howe claimed,
"we insist that he must be humiliated, as sending him to jail for
petty larceny, or to public work for vagrancy; but when he be-
comes a disgusting, beastly drunkard, we tell him in confidence
that he is not to blame, and that his enemies the saloon-keepers,
are responsible."^^ Saloon defenders, like temperance reformers,
emphasized that those who drank excessively often chose to
practice other vices as well. But whereas reformers saw the other
vices proceeding from the paralysis of the will caused by drink,
saloon proponents believed that generally sinful men chose to
drink to excess, just as they chose to indulge in other sorts of
excess. They saw drunkenness as a consequence of, rather than
a cause of, sin and vice. This is the larger intellectual context for
saloonkeepers' lawyers' clearly pragmatic but strikingly critical
38. Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (New Haven, CT,
1957), 139,143^4.
39. Edgar Watson Howe, The Story of a Country Town (Atchison, KS, 1883), 98.
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stance towards excessive drinkers in civil damage suits. "He's a
shiftless, lazy, drinking sort of a creature?" asked one lawyer.
Another described a subject of a suit as "one of this class of boys
that are brought up in town that do not work." A third referred
to excessive drinkers as "old bum[s]" and as "vicious." A fourth
described a drinker as "accustomed also to gambling and prac-
ticing other evil vices, [who] was also a spendthrift and devoted
his time to drinking, gambling, and idleness." Some judges in-
structed juries that if a drinker's actions were caused not by his
drunkenness but by his "natural inclination or general deprav-
ity," plaintiffs could not recover.^
The anti-temperance insistence on the personal responsibil-
ity of the drinker for his actions was both religious and political.
First, it emerged from a commitment to the idea of sin and a
passionate rejection of the perfectionism it understood to be
pervading the temperance movement. As one anti-temperance
pamphleteer put it, "Prohibition was first tested in the Garden
of Eden—and failed. The fall of man and his free agency were
the results. All the imperfections of our moral nature are, ac-
cording to the Scripture, consequences of this first failure of pro-
hibition; for had not Eve plucked and eaten the forbidden fruit,
man would be perfect. As it is, we are foredoomed to sin and
suffer for sinning, but we are free agents."" Like late twentieth-
century opponents of gun control who insist that "guns don't
kill people: people kill people," prohibition opponents took
issue with the idea that the availability of alcohol caused indi-
viduals to act immorally. One temperance opponent, writing
to a temperance newspaper, complained that "much is said of
Alcohol destroying such vast numbers of lives, as if it was the
active agent in the matter."'*^ Because temperance reforms were
40. Douglas D. Lowry v. Sylvia L. Coster (1877), testimony of John Hable, p. 49,
Case Files, ISA (91 111. 182); George E. Jewell v. Patrick Welch, Herbert Babcock. and
Andreiu Haberstumpf (1898). p. 14, Bound Briefs, MSLL (117 Mich. 65, 75 N.W.
283; Bissell v. Starzinger. Appellee's Argument, p. 5; Jennie E. Woody v. John Coe-
nan (1876), p. 4, Defendant's Response, ibid. (44 Iowa 19); Harriet Dennison v.
Charles W. Van Wormer. Myer Ephraim, and Thomas Doyle (1895), Charge to Ihe
Jury, p. 35, Bound Briefs, MSLL (107 Mich. 461,65 N.W. 274.
41. G[allus] Thomarui, Real and Imaginary Effects of Intemperance: A Statistical
Sketch (New York, 1884), 66.
42. Iowa Temperance Standard, 10 June 1869.
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based on a flawed perception of the nature of sin, opponents
believed, they would fail. In the earlier decades of the century,
one writer had evoked the "native depravity of the human
heart" as the ineradicable root of drunkenness. Although much
of this rhetoric was toned down in later decades, temperance
opponents' insistence on human imperfection remained con-
stant.
If temperance opponents were right, of course, neither a
judgment against a saloonkeeper nor any larger prohibition
agenda would be an appropriate way to help the drunkard and
his family. Social progress, if it happened, would result not from
limiting an individual's opporturüty to sin, but from the indi-
viduals' own moral improvement. As an opponent of prohibi-
tion put it, "We believe it pleased God, in the creation of all
things, to place before man good and evil, and to make him a
free moral agent to choose between the two knowing, in His
infinite wisdom, that in the fullness of time man would be led
to choose the good alone, and so the evil would have wrought
successfully for his discipline."*^ This anonjTHOUS author was
more sanguine about the possibilities of social improvement
than were most opponents of prohibition, but the argument
against "legal suasion" was typical.
Acting as though drinkers lacked responsibility for their
actions, opponents of prohibition worried, would orüy en-
courage them to pursue viciousness, secure in the belief that
they would be neither punished nor blamed. Walt Whitman
made this common pro-drink argument in his highly idiosyn-
cratic early temperance novel. Franklin Evans {1842). "I have
sometimes thought," he wrote," that the laws ought not to
punish those actions of evil which are committed when the
senses are steeped in intoxication. But if such a principle were
allowed to influence judicial decisions, how terrible an open-
ing there would be! How great a temptation, even, to the let-
43. "A Clergyman" [Rev. C. Reed], Reasons for Not Joining the Temperance Society
(Richmond, VA, 1836), 22.
44. New England Journalist, The Ramrod Broken; Or, The Bible, History, and Com-
mon Sense in Favor of the Moderate Use of Good Spirituous Liquors: Showing the Ad-
vantage of a License System in Preference to Prohibition, and "Moral" in Preference to
"Legal Suasion" (Boston, MA, 1859), 22.
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ting loose of the worst passions."*^ In lifting blame from drink-
ers' shoulders, reformers took away whatever incentive drirxk-
ers may have had to improve and perhaps encouraged them to
even worse crimes.
But the greatest danger of the path temperance reformers
were pursuing, their opponents argued, was that in falsely im-
agining that a class of people lacked free will, they threatened
actually to rob them of Üie freedom to exercise that will. William
Novak traces this line of argument among opponents of prohi-
bition and argues that, in fact, opponents of prohibition were
absolutely correct in perceiving prohibition legislation as having
"transformed traditional understandings of the scope of legis-
lation, the nature of rights, and the locus of public power" in
such a way as to limit traditional freedoms.^ * The freedom to
choose sin, they argued, was an essential aspect of moral liberty.
As an antebellum southem pamphleteer insisted in 1836, "as a
moral agent, [man] is endowed with both reason and appetite.
. . . through fear of his ruin, shall we impose on him restraints in
advance? Then suppress all his appetites reduce him at once
to a mere stock and stone; he then will be safe."*^ Only by de-
priving man of freedom, enslaving, or even dehumanizing him,
could society ensure that he would not choose sin.
Temperance opponents also believed that, in letting the
drunkard off the hook for his behavior, temperance reformers
threatened to erode the basis of American political liberty. Much
to the discomfort of temperance reformers, organizations of
saloonkeepers and their supporters frequently invoked the lan-
guage of freedom and liberty. Temperance opponents tended
to give their organizations names such as "Personal Liberty
League" and give speeches such as "Prohibition versus Per-
sonal Liberty" invoking hereditary rights.*^ Saloon supporters
45. Walt Whitman, Franklin Evans; Or, The Inebriate (New York, 1929), 147.
46. William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-
Century America (Chapel Hill, NC, 1996), 175.
47. "A Clergyman," Reasons Jbr Not Joining the Temperance Society, 27.
48. B. H. Carroll, Personal Liberty: A Lecture by Rev. B. H. Carroll, D. D., delivered
at Waco, Texas, January 18th, 1887 (Waco, TX, 1887); Aimer M. Collins, Prohibi-
tion V. Personal Liberty; Or, The Liquor Traffic Critically Examined in the Light of
Science, Theology, and Civil Govemmeixt (St. Louis, 1882). Herbert Asbury, The
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used the language of liberty; in particular they emphasized its
ties to the core of the nation's political heritage. As historians of
drink and temperance in the United States have noted, the tem-
perance movement, through the runeteenth century, had been
gradually appropriating the term liberty to mean not "freedom
from governmental interference" but rather "freedom from en-
slavement to alcohol."*' The obligation to take responsibility for
one's own actions was a prerequisite not only to morality but
also to political liberty. If the choice to drink was not an autono-
mous choice of a free citizen, goverrunent could take away that
choice without violating democratic rights and freedoms. If
drinkers were more like slaves than like free men, temperance
reformers insisted, prohibition violated no one's liberties.
By the end of the nineteenth century, supporters and oppo-
nents of the saloon, in Iowa and around the country, saw the
relationship between government, tíie individual will, and drink
very differently than they had at the begirming of the century.
Temperance reformers had become irrevocably committed to
the move the Iowa legislature had made during the Civil War.
Most northem states had passed their own civil damage laws
by century's end. Decades after slavery's end, temperance re-
formers still frequently mobilized the language of slavery in de-
scribing the drunkard's plight. In courtrooms and in countless
stories, speeches, novels, poems, and plays, they repeated again
and again that alcohol and its purveyors enslaved the will of
male citizens, and that the government needed to step in force-
fully to restore the proper order of things. Saloon defenders,
who championed a more traditional, religiously inspired indi-
vidualism, tended more and more to lose out in the public de-
bate. Only with the perceived failure of prohibition during the
Great Depression did their arguments begin to take on greater
resonance once again.
Great Illusion: An Informal History of Prohibition (New York, 1950), 106, describes
the founding of the Milwaukee Personal Liberty League in 1882. Duis, The
Saloon, 81, discusses the founding of Chicago's Liberty League in 1875,
49. W. J. Rorabaugh, 77« Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition (New York,
1979), 37.
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THE HISTORY of Smith's Civil Damage Liquor Law is worth
remembering for two reasons. First, it sheds light on the emer-
gence of an idea of legal responsibility that is still very much
with us, and still very controversial, today: the idea that the
purveyor of an addictive substance can be held accountable for
the actions of his or her customer. As long as we continue to con-
sider the concept of unalienable individual responsibility as one
of the keys of our social order, and as long as we continue to
sense that there are many forces in society that individuals can-
not resist effectively, this tension will continue to be a social issue.
Just as importantly, however, the history of Smith's Civil Damage
Liquor Law reminds us of how fluid ideas can be. Prejudices and
fears about African Americar\s and, to a lesser extent, about
American Indians, affected how a large group of nineteenth-
century white men came to be treated under the law. The meta-
phor of slavery was an enormously powerful one in the nine-
teenth century, and it had serious practical cor\sequences, as
"slaves to the bottle" and their defenders came to understand
all too well.
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